The Gospel Of Small And Medium-Sized Technological Enterprises: Anti Monopoly Guidelines In The Field Of Platform Economy (Draft)
Antitrust guidelines in the field of platform economy
(Draft for comments)
Chapter I General Provisions
Article 1 Purpose and basis of the guide
In order to prevent and stop the monopoly behavior in the economic field of Internet platform, reduce the cost of administrative law enforcement and operators' compliance, strengthen and improve the anti-monopoly supervision in the field of platform economy, protect fair market competition, safeguard the interests of consumers and social public interests, and promote the sustained and healthy development of the platform economy, according to the anti monopoly law of the people's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "anti monopoly law") To develop this guide.
Article 2 basic principles
To carry out anti-monopoly supervision in the field of platform economy, we should adhere to the following principles:
(1) Create a fair competition order. Efforts should be made to prevent and stop monopoly behaviors that exclude and restrict competition, maintain a fair and open and inclusive development environment in the field of platform economy, reduce market entry barriers, promote more subjects to enter the market, participate in competition fairly and orderly, and stimulate market vitality.
(2) Strengthen scientific and effective supervision. The basic system, regulatory principles and analytical framework of the anti-monopoly law are applicable to all market entities in the field of platform economy. The anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies will strengthen competition analysis and legal argumentation, continuously strengthen and improve anti-monopoly supervision, and enhance the pertinence and scientificity of anti-monopoly law enforcement according to the development status, development law and own characteristics of the platform economy.
(3) Stimulate innovation and creativity. It is necessary to prevent and control the competition and innovation of the whole economy, and to prevent the competition, innovation and innovation of the whole economy, and to prevent the competition and innovation of the whole economy.
(4) Promote the healthy development of the industry. It is necessary to promote the development of the real economy through the platform of anti-monopoly, which can reduce the cost of supply and demand, maintain the efficiency of the market, and promote the development of the real economy.
(5) Safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties. The development of platform economy involves many subjects. While protecting fair market competition, protecting and promoting the development of the platform, antitrust supervision focuses on safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of operators, consumers and other parties in the platform, so that the whole society can share the technological progress and economic development achievements of the platform, and realize the overall ecological harmonious coexistence and healthy development of the platform economy.
Article 3 related concepts
(1) Platform, the platform referred to in this guide as Internet platform refers to the business organization form in which interdependent multilateral entities interact under the rules and matchmaking provided by specific carriers through network information technology, so as to jointly create value.
(2) Platform economy refers to an economic form in which resource allocation is coordinated and organized by the Internet platform.
(3) The operators and operators provide information exchange platform for legal person and market.
(4) Platform operators refer to the operators who provide goods or services (hereinafter referred to as commodities) in the Internet platform.
(5) Operators in the field of platform economy include platform operators, platform operators and other operators participating in platform economy.
Article 4 definition of relevant market
Platform economy involves many subjects, complicated business types and changeable competition dynamics. To define the relevant commodity markets and regional markets in the field of platform economy, we need to follow the general principles set by the anti monopoly law and the guidelines of the anti monopoly Commission of the State Council on the definition of relevant markets. At the same time, we should consider the characteristics of the platform economy and make a specific analysis based on individual cases.
(1) Related commodity market
The basic method to define the relevant commodity market in the field of platform economy is substitution analysis. When defining the relevant commodity market in the case, we can analyze the demand substitution based on the platform function, business model, user group, multilateral market, offline transaction and other factors; when the competitive constraint of supply substitution on the operator's behavior is similar to demand substitution, supply substitution analysis should be considered, which can be based on market entry, technical barriers, network effects, cross-border competition and other factors Analysis was made.
In the platform economy, the competition among operators is usually around the core business, in order to obtain the extensive and lasting attention of users. Therefore, when defining the relevant commodity market, we can not simply define the relevant commodity market according to the platform basic services, but also need to consider the possible cross platform network effect, and decide to define the platform as an independent market or define multiple related markets respectively.
(2) Related regional markets
The definition of regional market in the field of platform economy adopts the analysis of demand substitution and supply substitution. Define in case When it comes to the relevant regional market, we can comprehensively evaluate and consider the actual region of most users' choice of goods, users' language preference and consumption habits, relevant laws and regulations, the degree of competition constraints in different regions, and the integration of online and offline.
According to the characteristics of the platform, the relevant regional market is usually defined as Chinese market or specific regional market, and can also be defined as global market according to individual cases.
(3) The role of relevant market definition in various monopoly cases
Adhering to the principle of case analysis, different types of monopoly cases have different actual needs for the definition of relevant markets.
For the horizontal monopoly agreements such as fixed price and market segmentation between operators in the field of platform economy, as well as vertical monopoly agreements with fixed resale price and minimum resale price , antitrust Law enforcement agencies may not clearly define the relevant market in the determination of illegality.
For the cases of abusing market dominant position in the field of platform economy, the relevant market definition is usually the first step to identify operators' abuse of market dominance.
It is usually necessary to define the relevant market to carry out the antitrust review on the concentration of operators in the field of platform economy.
In a specific case, if the direct evidence is sufficient, the behavior that can only be implemented by relying on the dominant position of the market lasts for a long time and the damage effect is obvious, and it is insufficient or very difficult to accurately define the relevant market conditions, it is not necessary to define the relevant market, and directly determine that the operators in the platform economy have carried out monopoly behavior.
Chapter II monopoly agreement
The antimonopoly law forbids the operators to reach and implement monopoly agreements. The second chapter of the anti monopoly law is applicable to the determination of monopoly agreements in the field of platform economy. Monopoly agreements clearly listed in Articles 13 and 14 of the anti monopoly law shall be prohibited in principle; monopoly agreements that meet the conditions specified in Article 15 of the anti monopoly law may be exempted.
Article 5 form of monopoly agreement
Monopoly agreements in the field of platform economy mainly refer to the agreements, decisions or other collaborative behaviors of platform operators and operators within the platform to exclude and restrict competition. Agreements and decisions may be written or oral. Other cooperative behavior refers to the behavior that the operator does not explicitly conclude an agreement or decision, but there is coordination in essence.
Article 6 horizontal monopoly agreement
The operators in the field of platform economy with competitive relationship may reach horizontal monopoly agreements such as fixed price, market segmentation, production (Sales) restriction, new technology (product) restriction and boycott transaction through the following ways:
(1) Use the platform to collect or exchange price, sales and other sensitive information;
(2) Using technical means to contact the will;
(3) The data and algorithm are used to achieve consistent behavior;
(4) Other ways to help achieve synergy.
The price mentioned in this guide includes but is not limited to commodity price and commission, handling fee, membership fee, promotion fee and other fees charged by operators.
Article 7 vertical monopoly agreement
In the field of platform economy, operators and trading counterparts may reach vertical monopoly agreements such as fixed resale price and minimum resale price through the following ways:
(1) Using technical means to set the price automatically;
(2) Use the platform rules to unify the price;
(3) Price is directly or indirectly limited by data and algorithm;
(4) Using technical means, platform rules, data and algorithms to limit other trading conditions, eliminate and restrict market competition.
To analyze whether the MFN clause constitutes a vertical monopoly agreement, we can comprehensively consider the business motivation of the operator signing the clause, the ability to control the market, and the impact of the implementation of the clause on market competition, consumer interests and innovation.
The exclusive agreement reached between the platform operator and the trading counterpart may constitute other monopoly agreements stipulated in Article 14 of the anti monopoly law. Generally, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies will comprehensively consider the market power of platform operators, the relevant market competition conditions, and the degree of hindrance to other operators' access to relevant markets, and analyze whether the agreement has the effect of eliminating and restricting competition.
Article 8 hub and spoke agreement
The operators with competitive relationship may reach a hub and spoke agreement with the effect of horizontal monopoly agreement by means of vertical relationship with platform operators, or by the organization and coordination of platform operators. To analyze whether the agreement belongs to the monopoly agreement regulated by the anti-monopoly law, we can consider whether the operators with competitive relationship reach and implement the monopoly agreement by means of technical means, platform rules, data and algorithms, so as to exclude and restrict the relevant market competition.
Article 9 Determination of cooperative behavior
To identify the collaborative behavior in the field of platform economy, we can judge whether there is collaborative behavior through direct evidence. If the direct evidence is difficult to obtain, we can determine the operator's knowledge of relevant information according to the logical consistent indirect evidence, so as to determine whether there is cooperative behavior between operators. The operator can provide evidence to the contrary to prove that there is no cooperative behavior.
Article 10 leniency system
Horizontal monopoly agreements in the field of platform economy usually have the effect of excluding and restricting competition seriously. Anti monopoly law enforcement agencies encourage relevant operators to take the initiative to report the situation of horizontal monopoly agreements and provide important evidence, and at the same time stop suspected illegal activities and cooperate with the investigation. The antimonopoly law enforcement agency may reduce or exempt the punishment to the operators who meet the lenient application conditions.
Chapter III abuse of dominant market position
The antimonopoly law forbids operators with dominant market position from abusing market dominant position. The third chapter of the antimonopoly law is applicable to determine the abuse of market dominant position in the field of platform economy. Usually, we first define the relevant market, analyze whether the operator has a dominant position in the relevant market, and then analyze whether it constitutes the abuse of market dominant position according to the case.
Article 11 determination of market dominant position
According to the provisions of Article 19 of the antimonopoly law and Article 18 of the antimonopoly law, it is necessary to analyze the situation of antimonopoly operators and Article 18 of the antimonopoly law. Combined with the characteristics of platform economy, the following factors can be considered specifically:
(1) The market share of operators and the relevant market competition situation. To determine the market share of operators in the field of platform economy, we can consider the proportion of transaction amount, transaction quantity, number of users, hits, usage time or other indicators in the relevant market, as well as the duration of the market share.
Analyzing the competition situation of related market, we can consider the development status of relevant platform market, the number and market share of existing competitors, the characteristics of platform competition, the degree of platform difference, scale economy, and the situation of potential competitors.
(2) The ability of the operator to control the market. We can consider the operator's ability to control the upstream and downstream markets, the ability to hinder and influence other operators to enter the relevant market, the business model of relevant platforms, network effect, and the ability to influence or determine Commission, flow or other trading conditions.
(3) The financial and technical conditions of the operator. We can consider the investor situation, asset scale, profitability, financing ability, technological innovation and application ability, intellectual property rights, ability to master and process relevant data, and the extent to which the financial and technical conditions can promote the business expansion or consolidate and maintain the market position of the operator.
(4) The degree of dependence of other business operators on the business operators. We can consider the transaction relationship, transaction volume, transaction duration, lock-in effect, user stickiness between other operators and the operator, as well as the possibility of other operators turning to other platforms and switching costs.
(5) The degree of difficulty for other operators to enter the relevant market. We can consider the scale effect of the platform, the scale of capital investment, technical barriers, user diversity, data acquisition cost, user habits and so on.
(6) Other factors. We can consider other factors based on the characteristics of the platform economy to determine that the operator has a dominant position in the market.
Article 12 unfair price behavior
Operators in the field of platform economy, which have a dominant market position, may abuse their dominant market position to sell goods at an unfair high price or purchase goods at an unfair low price. The following factors can be taken into account in the analysis of whether it constitutes an unfair high price or an unfair low price:
(1) Whether the price is significantly higher or lower than the price of the same commodity or comparable commodity under the same or similar market conditions of operators in other platform economic fields;
(2) Whether the price is significantly higher or lower than the price of the same commodity or comparable commodity in other regions with the same or similar market conditions by the operator in the economic field of the platform;
(3) If the cost is basically stable, whether the operators in the economic field of the platform increase the sales price or reduce the purchase price beyond the normal range;
(4) In the economic field of the platform, whether the increase in price of goods sold by operators is significantly higher than that of cost increase, or whether the price reduction of purchased goods is significantly lower than that of cost reduction.
To identify the same or similar market conditions, we can generally consider the platform type, business model, transaction links, cost structure, transaction specific conditions and other factors.
Article 13 sales below cost
Platform operators with a dominant market position may abuse their dominant position in the market and sell goods at a price lower than the cost without proper reasons to exclude and restrict market competition.
To analyze whether it constitutes sales below cost, we generally focus on whether the platform operators crowd out other platform operators with competitive relationship at a price lower than the cost, and whether they increase the price and make improper profits after excluding other platform operators from the market.
When calculating the cost, it is generally necessary to consider the cost correlation between the relevant markets in the platform involved in the multilateral market.
Platform operators may have the following justifiable reasons for selling below cost:
(1) Develop other businesses within the platform within a reasonable period of time;
(2) To promote the entry of new commodities into the market within a reasonable period;
(3) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 14 refusal to deal
It is impossible for the operators to dominate the market, and there is no reason for them to dominate the market, and there is no reason for them to dominate the market. The following factors can be considered in the analysis of whether the transaction constitutes rejection:
(1) Stop, delay and interrupt the existing transaction with the counterpart;
(2) Refuse to carry out new transactions with counterparties;
(3) In the platform rules, algorithms, technology, traffic allocation and other aspects of the restrictions and obstacles, making it difficult for the trading counterpart to carry out transactions;
(4) The operator who controls the necessary facilities in the economic field of the platform refuses to trade with the counterpart on reasonable terms.
To determine whether a relevant platform constitutes a necessary facility, we generally need to consider the substitutability of other platforms, the existence of potential platforms, the feasibility of developing competitive platforms, the dependence of trading counterparts on the platforms, and the possible impact of opening platforms on the operators of such platforms.
To determine whether the relevant data constitutes a necessary facility, we generally need to consider whether the data is indispensable for participating in market competition, whether there are other access channels for data, the technical feasibility of data opening, and the possible impact of open data on the operators who own the data.
The operators in the field of platform economy may have the following justifiable reasons for refusing to trade:
(1) The transaction cannot be conducted due to objective reasons such as force majeure;
(2) The transaction security is affected due to the reason of the trading counterpart;
(3) Trading with the counterpart will result in improper loss of the platform operator's interests;
(4) The counterpart of the transaction explicitly or actually does not comply with the fair, reasonable and non discriminatory platform rules;
(5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 15 restricted transactions
The operators in the field of platform economy with dominant market position may abuse the dominant position of the market and restrict the market competition by restricting the trading counterpart without proper reasons. The following factors can be taken into consideration in analyzing whether it constitutes a restricted trading behavior:
(1) Require the trading counterpart to conduct "one out of two" or other behaviors with the same effect between competitive platforms;
(2) To limit the exclusive transaction between the counterpart and it;
(3) Restrict the counterpart to trade only with its designated operator;
(4) Restricted trading counterpart shall not trade with specific business operators.
The above-mentioned restrictions may be realized by written agreement, by telephone or oral negotiation with the trading counterpart, or by actual restrictions or barriers in terms of platform rules, data, algorithms and technologies.
To analyze whether it constitutes a restricted transaction, we can focus on the following two situations: one is that the restrictions imposed by platform operators through punitive measures such as search rights reduction, flow restriction, technical barriers, and deposit deduction, which may cause direct damage to market competition and consumers' interests, can generally be regarded as restricted trading behavior. Second, restrictions imposed by platform operators through incentives such as subsidies, discounts, preferences, and flow resource support may have a positive effect on the interests of operators, consumers and the overall welfare of the society. However, if the restrictions have an obvious impact on market competition, they may also be identified as restricted trading behavior.
In the field of platform economy, the operators may have the following justifiable reasons:
(1) It is necessary to protect the interests of the counterpart and consumers;
(2) Necessary for the protection of intellectual property rights or data security;
(3) Necessary for the protection of specific resource inputs for transactions;
(4) It is necessary to maintain a reasonable business model of the platform;
(5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 16 tying sale or attaching unreasonable transaction conditions
The operators in the field of platform economy with dominant market position may abuse the dominant position of the market, carry out tie-in or attach unreasonable trading conditions without justifiable reasons, so as to exclude and restrict market competition. The following factors can be taken into consideration in the analysis of whether it constitutes a tying sale or attaches unreasonable trading conditions:
(1) Different commodities are bundled and sold by means of format terms, pop-up window and necessary operation steps, which cannot be selected, changed or rejected by the trading counterpart;
(2) By means of punitive measures such as search rights reduction, flow restriction and technical barriers, the trading counterpart is forced to accept other commodities;
(3) Unreasonable restrictions are imposed on transaction terms and methods, service provision methods, payment methods and means, and after-sales guarantee;
(4) Charging unreasonable fees in addition to the transaction price;
(5) Mandatory collection of user information or additional transaction conditions unrelated to the subject matter of the transaction.
There may be legitimate reasons for tying operators to implement the platform in the following areas:
(1) Conform to proper trade practices and trading habits;
(2) The relative interests of consumers must be protected;
(3) It is necessary to improve the use value or efficiency of goods;
(4) It is necessary to maintain the normal operation of the platform;
(5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 17 differential treatment
There is no reason for the operators to abuse the market position and market competition. The following factors can be taken into account in the analysis of whether it constitutes a differential treatment:
(1) Based on big data and algorithms, according to the payment ability, consumption preference and usage habits of the trading counterpart, implement the differential transaction price or other transaction conditions;
(2) Based on big data and algorithms, implement different trading prices or other trading conditions for new and old trading counterparts;
(3) Implement the difference standard, rule and algorithm;
(4) Implement different payment terms and transaction methods.
The same condition means that there are no substantial differences between the trading counterparts in terms of transaction security, transaction cost, credit status, transaction links and transaction duration. The differences in the privacy information, transaction history, individual preference, consumption habits and other aspects of the transaction counterpart obtained by the platform in the transaction do not affect the identification of the same transaction counterpart conditions.
The operators in the field of platform economy may have the following justifiable reasons:
(1) According to the actual needs of the trading counterpart and in line with the legitimate trading habits and industry practices, different trading conditions are implemented;
(2) Preferential activities carried out within a reasonable period of time for the first transaction of new users;
(3) Random transaction based on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory rules of the platform;
(4) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Chapter IV concentration of business operators
The antimonopoly law forbids the concentration that has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. The antimonopoly law enforcement agency is based on the antimonopoly law Provisions of the State Council on the declaration standards for concentration of business operators And other laws and regulations, review the concentration of operators in the field of platform economy, and investigate and deal with the illegal concentration.
Article 18 application standards
In the field of platform economy, the calculation of turnover may be different according to different business models of operators. For the platform operators who only provide information matching and collect Commission, the turnover can be calculated by the service fee charged by the platform and other income of the platform; for the platform operators who specifically participate in the market competition on one side of the platform, the turnover can be calculated by the transaction amount involved in the platform and other income of the platform.
The concentration of business operators involving the framework of agreement control (VIE) belongs to the scope of anti-monopoly examination. If the concentration of business operators meets the declaration standards stipulated by the State Council, the business operators shall report to the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council in advance, and those without declaration shall not be concentrated.
Article 19 anti monopoly law enforcement agencies shall take the initiative to investigate
However, if the centralized business operators fail to comply with the provisions of the State Council on the application and exclusion of evidence, or according to the provisions of the State Council on the investigation and exclusion of evidence that may not meet the requirements of the State Council on the application and exclusion of the centralized business operators according to the provisions of the State Council.
The anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council will investigate and deal with the concentration of business operators that fail to meet the declaration standards in the field of platform economy and have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.
(1) The operators participating in the concentration are start-ups and emerging platforms;
(2) The turnover of the operators participating in the concentration is low because they adopt the mode of free or low price;
(3) The relative market concentration is high and the number of competitors is small;
(4) Other circumstances that have or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.
Business operators may take the initiative to report to the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council for the concentration of business operators that fail to meet the declaration standards.
Article 20 considerations
The antimonopoly law enforcement agency will assess the competitive impact of the concentration of operators in the platform field according to the factors specified in Article 27 of the anti monopoly law. Combined with the characteristics of platform economy, the following factors can be considered specifically:
(1) The market share of the operator in the relevant market. In order to calculate market share, in addition to turnover as an indicator, we can also consider the proportion of transaction amount, transaction quantity, number of users, hits, usage duration or other indicators in the relevant market, and comprehensively evaluate the market share in a long period of time according to the situation, and judge its dynamic change trend.
(2) The control power of operators on the market. We can consider whether the operator has exclusive rights to key and scarce resources and the duration of the exclusive rights, the stickiness and multi habitat of platform users, the ability of operators to master and process data, the control ability of data interface, the profitability and profit margin level of operators, the frequency and speed of technological innovation, the life cycle of commodities, and whether there is or is likely to occur Now subversive innovation.
(3) Concentration of relevant markets. We can consider the development of relevant platform market, the number of existing competitors and market share.
(4) The impact of concentration on market entry. We can consider the market access situation, the difficulty of operators to obtain necessary resources and facilities such as technology, intellectual property, data, channels, users, etc., the scale of capital investment needed to enter the relevant market, the conversion costs of users in terms of expenses, data migration, negotiation, learning, search, etc., and consider the possibility, timeliness and sufficiency of entry.
(5) The impact of concentration on technological progress. We can consider the impact of the competition in technology and business model of existing market competitors on the innovation motivation and ability of operators, and whether the acquisition of start-up enterprises and emerging platforms will affect innovation.
(6) The impact of concentration on consumers. We can consider whether the operators after concentration have the ability and motivation to increase commodity prices, reduce commodity quality, reduce commodity diversity, damage consumers' ability and scope of choice, treat different consumer groups differently, and improperly use consumer data to harm consumers' interests.
For the concentration of operators involving bilateral or multilateral platforms, it may be necessary to comprehensively consider the bilateral or multilateral business of the platform, and evaluate the direct and indirect network externalities.
Article 21 remedies
The antimonopoly law enforcement agency will make a decision in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the anti monopoly law for the concentration of business operators that has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition. The anti monopoly law enforcement agency may decide to attach the following types of restrictive conditions to the concentration that is not prohibited:
(1) Divestiture of tangible assets, intellectual property, technology, data and other intangible assets, or divestiture of related rights and interests and other structural conditions;
(2) Open network or platform infrastructure, license key technology, terminate exclusive agreement, modify platform rules or algorithms and other behavioral conditions;
(3) The comprehensive condition is the combination of structural conditions and behavioral conditions.
Chapter V abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition
The anti monopoly law forbids administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations to abuse administrative power to exclude and restrict competition. For platform economy Abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition behavior, according to the "anti-monopoly law" and other laws and regulations to investigate, put forward suggestions to deal with according to law.
Article 22 abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competitive behaviors
Administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations with the function of managing public affairs engage in the following acts to exclude and restrict market competition in the field of platform economy, which may constitute abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition:
(1) Restrict or restrict in disguised form the operation, purchase and use of the commodities provided by the operators in the platform economic field designated by them or the commodities related to platform services provided by other operators;
(2) Set discriminatory standards and implement discriminatory policies for operators in the field of foreign platform economy, take administrative license and record for operators in foreign platform economic field, or set up shielding measures through software and Internet to prevent and restrict operators in foreign platform economic field from entering local market and hinder free circulation of commodities among regions;
(3) Exclude or restrict operators in the field of foreign platform economy from participating in local bidding activities by setting discriminatory qualification requirements, evaluation standards or not releasing information according to law;
(4) Discriminative treatment shall be applied to the operators in the field of foreign platform economy, and foreign operators shall be excluded, restricted or forced to invest or set up branches locally;
(5) To compel or force in disguised form operators in the field of platform economy to engage in monopolistic acts stipulated in the anti monopoly law;
(6) In the form of regulations, measures, decisions, announcements, notices, opinions and minutes of meetings, the administrative organs formulate and issue rules, normative documents and other policies and measures involving the economic activities of market entities in the field of platform economy, which contain the contents of exclusion and restriction of competition.
Article 23 fair competition review
Administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations to manage public affairs shall formulate regulations, normative documents, other policy documents and specific policies and measures in the form of "one case, one discussion" concerning the economic activities of market entities in the field of platform economy, in accordance with the opinions of the State Council on Establishing a fair competition review system in the construction of market system (GF [2016] [No.34] requires fair competition review.
Chapter VI supplementary provisions
Article 24 These Guidelines shall be implemented as of the date of promulgation
Antitrust guidelines in the field of platform economy
(Draft for comments)
Chapter I General Provisions
Article 1 Purpose and basis of the guide
In order to prevent and stop the monopoly behavior in the economic field of Internet platform, reduce the cost of administrative law enforcement and operators' compliance, strengthen and improve the anti-monopoly supervision in the field of platform economy, protect fair market competition, safeguard the interests of consumers and social public interests, and promote the sustained and healthy development of the platform economy, according to the anti monopoly law of the people's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "anti monopoly law") To develop this guide.
Article 2 basic principles
To carry out anti-monopoly supervision in the field of platform economy, we should adhere to the following principles:
(1) Create a fair competition order. Efforts should be made to prevent and stop monopoly behaviors that exclude and restrict competition, maintain a fair and open and inclusive development environment in the field of platform economy, reduce market entry barriers, promote more subjects to enter the market, participate in competition fairly and orderly, and stimulate market vitality.
(2) Strengthen scientific and effective supervision. The basic system, regulatory principles and analytical framework of the anti-monopoly law are applicable to all market entities in the field of platform economy. The anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies will strengthen competition analysis and legal argumentation, continuously strengthen and improve anti-monopoly supervision, and enhance the pertinence and scientificity of anti-monopoly law enforcement according to the development status, development law and own characteristics of the platform economy.
(3) Stimulate innovation and creativity. It is necessary to prevent and control the competition and innovation of the whole economy, and to prevent the competition, innovation and innovation of the whole economy, and to prevent the competition and innovation of the whole economy.
(4) Promote the healthy development of the industry. It is necessary to promote the development of the real economy through the platform of anti-monopoly, which can reduce the cost of supply and demand, maintain the efficiency of the market, and promote the development of the real economy.
(5) Safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties. The development of platform economy involves many subjects. While protecting fair market competition, protecting and promoting the development of the platform, antitrust supervision focuses on safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of operators, consumers and other parties in the platform, so that the whole society can share the technological progress and economic development achievements of the platform, and realize the overall ecological harmonious coexistence and healthy development of the platform economy.
Article 3 related concepts
(1) Platform, the platform referred to in this guide as Internet platform refers to the business organization form in which interdependent multilateral entities interact under the rules and matchmaking provided by specific carriers through network information technology, so as to jointly create value.
(2) Platform economy refers to an economic form in which resource allocation is coordinated and organized by the Internet platform.
(3) The operators and operators provide information exchange platform for legal person and market.
(4) Platform operators refer to the operators who provide goods or services (hereinafter referred to as commodities) in the Internet platform.
(5) Operators in the field of platform economy include platform operators, platform operators and other operators participating in platform economy.
Article 4 definition of relevant market
Platform economy involves many subjects, complicated business types and changeable competition dynamics. To define the relevant commodity markets and regional markets in the field of platform economy, we need to follow the general principles set by the anti monopoly law and the guidelines of the anti monopoly Commission of the State Council on the definition of relevant markets. At the same time, we should consider the characteristics of the platform economy and make a specific analysis based on individual cases.
(1) Related commodity market
The basic method to define the relevant commodity market in the field of platform economy is substitution analysis. When defining the relevant commodity market in the case, we can analyze the demand substitution based on the platform function, business model, user group, multilateral market, offline transaction and other factors; when the competitive constraint of supply substitution on the operator's behavior is similar to demand substitution, supply substitution analysis should be considered, which can be based on market entry, technical barriers, network effects, cross-border competition and other factors Analysis was made.
In the platform economy, the competition among operators is usually around the core business, in order to obtain the extensive and lasting attention of users. Therefore, when defining the relevant commodity market, we can not simply define the relevant commodity market according to the platform basic services, but also need to consider the possible cross platform network effect, and decide to define the platform as an independent market or define multiple related markets respectively.
(2) Related regional markets
The definition of regional market in the field of platform economy adopts the analysis of demand substitution and supply substitution. Define in case When it comes to the relevant regional market, we can comprehensively evaluate and consider the actual region of most users' choice of goods, users' language preference and consumption habits, relevant laws and regulations, the degree of competition constraints in different regions, and the integration of online and offline.
According to the characteristics of the platform, the relevant regional market is usually defined as Chinese market or specific regional market, and can also be defined as global market according to individual cases.
(3) The role of relevant market definition in various monopoly cases
Adhering to the principle of case analysis, different types of monopoly cases have different actual needs for the definition of relevant markets.
For the horizontal monopoly agreements such as fixed price and market segmentation between operators in the field of platform economy, as well as vertical monopoly agreements with fixed resale price and minimum resale price , antitrust Law enforcement agencies may not clearly define the relevant market in the determination of illegality.
For the cases of abusing market dominant position in the field of platform economy, the relevant market definition is usually the first step to identify operators' abuse of market dominance.
It is usually necessary to define the relevant market to carry out the antitrust review on the concentration of operators in the field of platform economy.
In a specific case, if the direct evidence is sufficient, the behavior that can only be implemented by relying on the dominant position of the market lasts for a long time and the damage effect is obvious, and it is insufficient or very difficult to accurately define the relevant market conditions, it is not necessary to define the relevant market, and directly determine that the operators in the platform economy have carried out monopoly behavior.
Chapter II monopoly agreement
The antimonopoly law forbids the operators to reach and implement monopoly agreements. The second chapter of the anti monopoly law is applicable to the determination of monopoly agreements in the field of platform economy. Monopoly agreements clearly listed in Articles 13 and 14 of the anti monopoly law shall be prohibited in principle; monopoly agreements that meet the conditions specified in Article 15 of the anti monopoly law may be exempted.
Article 5 form of monopoly agreement
Monopoly agreements in the field of platform economy mainly refer to the agreements, decisions or other collaborative behaviors of platform operators and operators within the platform to exclude and restrict competition. Agreements and decisions may be written or oral. Other cooperative behavior refers to the behavior that the operator does not explicitly conclude an agreement or decision, but there is coordination in essence.
Article 6 horizontal monopoly agreement
The operators in the field of platform economy with competitive relationship may reach horizontal monopoly agreements such as fixed price, market segmentation, production (Sales) restriction, new technology (product) restriction and boycott transaction through the following ways:
(1) Use the platform to collect or exchange price, sales and other sensitive information;
(2) Using technical means to contact the will;
(3) The data and algorithm are used to achieve consistent behavior;
(4) Other ways to help achieve synergy.
The price mentioned in this guide includes but is not limited to commodity price and commission, handling fee, membership fee, promotion fee and other fees charged by operators.
Article 7 vertical monopoly agreement
In the field of platform economy, operators and trading counterparts may reach vertical monopoly agreements such as fixed resale price and minimum resale price through the following ways:
(1) Using technical means to set the price automatically;
(2) Use the platform rules to unify the price;
(3) Price is directly or indirectly limited by data and algorithm;
(4) Using technical means, platform rules, data and algorithms to limit other trading conditions, eliminate and restrict market competition.
To analyze whether the MFN clause constitutes a vertical monopoly agreement, we can comprehensively consider the business motivation of the operator signing the clause, the ability to control the market, and the impact of the implementation of the clause on market competition, consumer interests and innovation.
The exclusive agreement reached between the platform operator and the trading counterpart may constitute other monopoly agreements stipulated in Article 14 of the anti monopoly law. Generally, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies will comprehensively consider the market power of platform operators, the relevant market competition conditions, and the degree of hindrance to other operators' access to relevant markets, and analyze whether the agreement has the effect of eliminating and restricting competition.
Article 8 hub and spoke agreement
The operators with competitive relationship may reach a hub and spoke agreement with the effect of horizontal monopoly agreement by means of vertical relationship with platform operators, or by the organization and coordination of platform operators. To analyze whether the agreement belongs to the monopoly agreement regulated by the anti-monopoly law, we can consider whether the operators with competitive relationship reach and implement the monopoly agreement by means of technical means, platform rules, data and algorithms, so as to exclude and restrict the relevant market competition.
Article 9 Determination of cooperative behavior
To identify the collaborative behavior in the field of platform economy, we can judge whether there is collaborative behavior through direct evidence. If the direct evidence is difficult to obtain, we can determine the operator's knowledge of relevant information according to the logical consistent indirect evidence, so as to determine whether there is cooperative behavior between operators. The operator can provide evidence to the contrary to prove that there is no cooperative behavior.
Article 10 leniency system
Horizontal monopoly agreements in the field of platform economy usually have the effect of excluding and restricting competition seriously. Anti monopoly law enforcement agencies encourage relevant operators to take the initiative to report the situation of horizontal monopoly agreements and provide important evidence, and at the same time stop suspected illegal activities and cooperate with the investigation. The antimonopoly law enforcement agency may reduce or exempt the punishment to the operators who meet the lenient application conditions.
Chapter III abuse of dominant market position
The antimonopoly law forbids operators with dominant market position from abusing market dominant position. The third chapter of the antimonopoly law is applicable to determine the abuse of market dominant position in the field of platform economy. Usually, we first define the relevant market, analyze whether the operator has a dominant position in the relevant market, and then analyze whether it constitutes the abuse of market dominant position according to the case.
Article 11 determination of market dominant position
According to the provisions of Article 19 of the antimonopoly law and Article 18 of the antimonopoly law, it is necessary to analyze the situation of antimonopoly operators and Article 18 of the antimonopoly law. Combined with the characteristics of platform economy, the following factors can be considered specifically:
(1) The market share of operators and the relevant market competition situation. To determine the market share of operators in the field of platform economy, we can consider the proportion of transaction amount, transaction quantity, number of users, hits, usage time or other indicators in the relevant market, as well as the duration of the market share.
Analyzing the competition situation of related market, we can consider the development status of relevant platform market, the number and market share of existing competitors, the characteristics of platform competition, the degree of platform difference, scale economy, and the situation of potential competitors.
(2) The ability of the operator to control the market. We can consider the operator's ability to control the upstream and downstream markets, the ability to hinder and influence other operators to enter the relevant market, the business model of relevant platforms, network effect, and the ability to influence or determine Commission, flow or other trading conditions.
(3) The financial and technical conditions of the operator. We can consider the investor situation, asset scale, profitability, financing ability, technological innovation and application ability, intellectual property rights, ability to master and process relevant data, and the extent to which the financial and technical conditions can promote the business expansion or consolidate and maintain the market position of the operator.
(4) The degree of dependence of other business operators on the business operators. We can consider the transaction relationship, transaction volume, transaction duration, lock-in effect, user stickiness between other operators and the operator, as well as the possibility of other operators turning to other platforms and switching costs.
(5) The degree of difficulty for other operators to enter the relevant market. We can consider the scale effect of the platform, the scale of capital investment, technical barriers, user diversity, data acquisition cost, user habits and so on.
(6) Other factors. We can consider other factors based on the characteristics of the platform economy to determine that the operator has a dominant position in the market.
Article 12 unfair price behavior
Operators in the field of platform economy, which have a dominant market position, may abuse their dominant market position to sell goods at an unfair high price or purchase goods at an unfair low price. The following factors can be taken into account in the analysis of whether it constitutes an unfair high price or an unfair low price:
(1) Whether the price is significantly higher or lower than the price of the same commodity or comparable commodity under the same or similar market conditions of operators in other platform economic fields;
(2) Whether the price is significantly higher or lower than the price of the same commodity or comparable commodity in other regions with the same or similar market conditions by the operator in the economic field of the platform;
(3) If the cost is basically stable, whether the operators in the economic field of the platform increase the sales price or reduce the purchase price beyond the normal range;
(4) In the economic field of the platform, whether the increase in price of goods sold by operators is significantly higher than that of cost increase, or whether the price reduction of purchased goods is significantly lower than that of cost reduction.
To identify the same or similar market conditions, we can generally consider the platform type, business model, transaction links, cost structure, transaction specific conditions and other factors.
Article 13 sales below cost
Platform operators with a dominant market position may abuse their dominant position in the market and sell goods at a price lower than the cost without proper reasons to exclude and restrict market competition.
To analyze whether it constitutes sales below cost, we generally focus on whether the platform operators crowd out other platform operators with competitive relationship at a price lower than the cost, and whether they increase the price and make improper profits after excluding other platform operators from the market.
When calculating the cost, it is generally necessary to consider the cost correlation between the relevant markets in the platform involved in the multilateral market.
Platform operators may have the following justifiable reasons for selling below cost:
(1) Develop other businesses within the platform within a reasonable period of time;
(2) To promote the entry of new commodities into the market within a reasonable period;
(3) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 14 refusal to deal
It is impossible for the operators to dominate the market, and there is no reason for them to dominate the market, and there is no reason for them to dominate the market. The following factors can be considered in the analysis of whether the transaction constitutes rejection:
(1) Stop, delay and interrupt the existing transaction with the counterpart;
(2) Refuse to carry out new transactions with counterparties;
(3) In the platform rules, algorithms, technology, traffic allocation and other aspects of the restrictions and obstacles, making it difficult for the trading counterpart to carry out transactions;
(4) The operator who controls the necessary facilities in the economic field of the platform refuses to trade with the counterpart on reasonable terms.
To determine whether a relevant platform constitutes a necessary facility, we generally need to consider the substitutability of other platforms, the existence of potential platforms, the feasibility of developing competitive platforms, the dependence of trading counterparts on the platforms, and the possible impact of opening platforms on the operators of such platforms.
To determine whether the relevant data constitutes a necessary facility, we generally need to consider whether the data is indispensable for participating in market competition, whether there are other access channels for data, the technical feasibility of data opening, and the possible impact of open data on the operators who own the data.
The operators in the field of platform economy may have the following justifiable reasons for refusing to trade:
(1) The transaction cannot be conducted due to objective reasons such as force majeure;
(2) The transaction security is affected due to the reason of the trading counterpart;
(3) Trading with the counterpart will result in improper loss of the platform operator's interests;
(4) The counterpart of the transaction explicitly or actually does not comply with the fair, reasonable and non discriminatory platform rules;
(5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 15 restricted transactions
The operators in the field of platform economy with dominant market position may abuse the dominant position of the market and restrict the market competition by restricting the trading counterpart without proper reasons. The following factors can be taken into consideration in analyzing whether it constitutes a restricted trading behavior:
(1) Require the trading counterpart to conduct "one out of two" or other behaviors with the same effect between competitive platforms;
(2) To limit the exclusive transaction between the counterpart and it;
(3) Restrict the counterpart to trade only with its designated operator;
(4) Restricted trading counterpart shall not trade with specific business operators.
The above-mentioned restrictions may be realized by written agreement, by telephone or oral negotiation with the trading counterpart, or by actual restrictions or barriers in terms of platform rules, data, algorithms and technologies.
To analyze whether it constitutes a restricted transaction, we can focus on the following two situations: one is that the restrictions imposed by platform operators through punitive measures such as search rights reduction, flow restriction, technical barriers, and deposit deduction, which may cause direct damage to market competition and consumers' interests, can generally be regarded as restricted trading behavior. Second, restrictions imposed by platform operators through incentives such as subsidies, discounts, preferences, and flow resource support may have a positive effect on the interests of operators, consumers and the overall welfare of the society. However, if the restrictions have an obvious impact on market competition, they may also be identified as restricted trading behavior.
In the field of platform economy, the operators may have the following justifiable reasons:
(1) It is necessary to protect the interests of the counterpart and consumers;
(2) Necessary for the protection of intellectual property rights or data security;
(3) Necessary for the protection of specific resource inputs for transactions;
(4) It is necessary to maintain a reasonable business model of the platform;
(5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 16 tying sale or attaching unreasonable transaction conditions
The operators in the field of platform economy with dominant market position may abuse the dominant position of the market, carry out tie-in or attach unreasonable trading conditions without justifiable reasons, so as to exclude and restrict market competition. The following factors can be taken into consideration in the analysis of whether it constitutes a tying sale or attaches unreasonable trading conditions:
(1) Different commodities are bundled and sold by means of format terms, pop-up window and necessary operation steps, which cannot be selected, changed or rejected by the trading counterpart;
(2) By means of punitive measures such as search rights reduction, flow restriction and technical barriers, the trading counterpart is forced to accept other commodities;
(3) Unreasonable restrictions are imposed on transaction terms and methods, service provision methods, payment methods and means, and after-sales guarantee;
(4) Charging unreasonable fees in addition to the transaction price;
(5) Mandatory collection of user information or additional transaction conditions unrelated to the subject matter of the transaction.
There may be legitimate reasons for tying operators to implement the platform in the following areas:
(1) Conform to proper trade practices and trading habits;
(2) The relative interests of consumers must be protected;
(3) It is necessary to improve the use value or efficiency of goods;
(4) It is necessary to maintain the normal operation of the platform;
(5) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Article 17 differential treatment
There is no reason for the operators to abuse the market position and market competition. The following factors can be taken into account in the analysis of whether it constitutes a differential treatment:
(1) Based on big data and algorithms, according to the payment ability, consumption preference and usage habits of the trading counterpart, implement the differential transaction price or other transaction conditions;
(2) Based on big data and algorithms, implement different trading prices or other trading conditions for new and old trading counterparts;
(3) Implement the difference standard, rule and algorithm;
(4) Implement different payment terms and transaction methods.
The same condition means that there are no substantial differences between the trading counterparts in terms of transaction security, transaction cost, credit status, transaction links and transaction duration. The differences in the privacy information, transaction history, individual preference, consumption habits and other aspects of the transaction counterpart obtained by the platform in the transaction do not affect the identification of the same transaction counterpart conditions.
The operators in the field of platform economy may have the following justifiable reasons:
(1) According to the actual needs of the trading counterpart and in line with the legitimate trading habits and industry practices, different trading conditions are implemented;
(2) Preferential activities carried out within a reasonable period of time for the first transaction of new users;
(3) Random transaction based on fair, reasonable and non discriminatory rules of the platform;
(4) Other reasons that can justify the conduct.
Chapter IV concentration of business operators
The antimonopoly law forbids the concentration that has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. The antimonopoly law enforcement agency is based on the antimonopoly law Provisions of the State Council on the declaration standards for concentration of business operators And other laws and regulations, review the concentration of operators in the field of platform economy, and investigate and deal with the illegal concentration.
Article 18 application standards
In the field of platform economy, the calculation of turnover may be different according to different business models of operators. For the platform operators who only provide information matching and collect Commission, the turnover can be calculated by the service fee charged by the platform and other income of the platform; for the platform operators who specifically participate in the market competition on one side of the platform, the turnover can be calculated by the transaction amount involved in the platform and other income of the platform.
The concentration of business operators involving the framework of agreement control (VIE) belongs to the scope of anti-monopoly examination. If the concentration of business operators meets the declaration standards stipulated by the State Council, the business operators shall report to the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council in advance, and those without declaration shall not be concentrated.
Article 19 anti monopoly law enforcement agencies shall take the initiative to investigate
However, if the centralized business operators fail to comply with the provisions of the State Council on the application and exclusion of evidence, or according to the provisions of the State Council on the investigation and exclusion of evidence that may not meet the requirements of the State Council on the application and exclusion of the centralized business operators according to the provisions of the State Council.
The anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council will investigate and deal with the concentration of business operators that fail to meet the declaration standards in the field of platform economy and have or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition.
(1) The operators participating in the concentration are start-ups and emerging platforms;
(2) The turnover of the operators participating in the concentration is low because they adopt the mode of free or low price;
(3) The relative market concentration is high and the number of competitors is small;
(4) Other circumstances that have or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition.
Business operators may take the initiative to report to the anti monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council for the concentration of business operators that fail to meet the declaration standards.
Article 20 considerations
The antimonopoly law enforcement agency will assess the competitive impact of the concentration of operators in the platform field according to the factors specified in Article 27 of the anti monopoly law. Combined with the characteristics of platform economy, the following factors can be considered specifically:
(1) The market share of the operator in the relevant market. In order to calculate market share, in addition to turnover as an indicator, we can also consider the proportion of transaction amount, transaction quantity, number of users, hits, usage duration or other indicators in the relevant market, and comprehensively evaluate the market share in a long period of time according to the situation, and judge its dynamic change trend.
(2) The control power of operators on the market. We can consider whether the operator has exclusive rights to key and scarce resources and the duration of the exclusive rights, the stickiness and multi habitat of platform users, the ability of operators to master and process data, the control ability of data interface, the profitability and profit margin level of operators, the frequency and speed of technological innovation, the life cycle of commodities, and whether there is or is likely to occur Now subversive innovation.
(3) Concentration of relevant markets. We can consider the development of relevant platform market, the number of existing competitors and market share.
(4) The impact of concentration on market entry. We can consider the market access situation, the difficulty of operators to obtain necessary resources and facilities such as technology, intellectual property, data, channels, users, etc., the scale of capital investment needed to enter the relevant market, the conversion costs of users in terms of expenses, data migration, negotiation, learning, search, etc., and consider the possibility, timeliness and sufficiency of entry.
(5) The impact of concentration on technological progress. We can consider the impact of the competition in technology and business model of existing market competitors on the innovation motivation and ability of operators, and whether the acquisition of start-up enterprises and emerging platforms will affect innovation.
(6) The impact of concentration on consumers. We can consider whether the operators after concentration have the ability and motivation to increase commodity prices, reduce commodity quality, reduce commodity diversity, damage consumers' ability and scope of choice, treat different consumer groups differently, and improperly use consumer data to harm consumers' interests.
For the concentration of operators involving bilateral or multilateral platforms, it may be necessary to comprehensively consider the bilateral or multilateral business of the platform, and evaluate the direct and indirect network externalities.
Article 21 remedies
The antimonopoly law enforcement agency will make a decision in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 of the anti monopoly law for the concentration of business operators that has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition. The anti monopoly law enforcement agency may decide to attach the following types of restrictive conditions to the concentration that is not prohibited:
(1) Divestiture of tangible assets, intellectual property, technology, data and other intangible assets, or divestiture of related rights and interests and other structural conditions;
(2) Open network or platform infrastructure, license key technology, terminate exclusive agreement, modify platform rules or algorithms and other behavioral conditions;
(3) The comprehensive condition is the combination of structural conditions and behavioral conditions.
Chapter V abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition
The anti monopoly law forbids administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations to abuse administrative power to exclude and restrict competition. For platform economy Abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict competition behavior, according to the "anti-monopoly law" and other laws and regulations to investigate, put forward suggestions to deal with according to law.
Article 22 abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competitive behaviors
Administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations with the function of managing public affairs engage in the following acts to exclude and restrict market competition in the field of platform economy, which may constitute abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition:
(1) Restrict or restrict in disguised form the operation, purchase and use of the commodities provided by the operators in the platform economic field designated by them or the commodities related to platform services provided by other operators;
(2) Set discriminatory standards and implement discriminatory policies for operators in the field of foreign platform economy, take administrative license and record for operators in foreign platform economic field, or set up shielding measures through software and Internet to prevent and restrict operators in foreign platform economic field from entering local market and hinder free circulation of commodities among regions;
(3) Exclude or restrict operators in the field of foreign platform economy from participating in local bidding activities by setting discriminatory qualification requirements, evaluation standards or not releasing information according to law;
(4) Discriminative treatment shall be applied to the operators in the field of foreign platform economy, and foreign operators shall be excluded, restricted or forced to invest or set up branches locally;
(5) To compel or force in disguised form operators in the field of platform economy to engage in monopolistic acts stipulated in the anti monopoly law;
(6) In the form of regulations, measures, decisions, announcements, notices, opinions and minutes of meetings, the administrative organs formulate and issue rules, normative documents and other policies and measures involving the economic activities of market entities in the field of platform economy, which contain the contents of exclusion and restriction of competition.
Article 23 fair competition review
Administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations to manage public affairs shall formulate regulations, normative documents, other policy documents and specific policies and measures in the form of "one case, one discussion" concerning the economic activities of market entities in the field of platform economy, in accordance with the opinions of the State Council on Establishing a fair competition review system in the construction of market system (GF [2016] [No.34] requires fair competition review.
Chapter VI supplementary provisions
Article 24 These Guidelines shall be implemented as of the date of promulgation
Please:
1、 Log in to the website of the State Administration of market supervision (http: / / www.samr. Gov.cn) and put forward opinions through the "solicitation survey" in the "interaction" column on the home page.
2. Send the opinions to fldj @ samr. Gov.cn via email, and the subject of the email should be "public consultation on the anti monopoly guidelines on platform economy (Draft)".
3. Mail the opinions to: No. 8, Sanlihe East Road, Xicheng District, Beijing, Anti Monopoly Bureau of the State Administration of market supervision, postcode: 100820. Please mark on the envelope the words "public comments on the anti monopoly guidelines on platform economy (Draft)".
- Related reading
Working Meeting Of Vice Chairman Of China Textile Federation Intellectual Property Alliance Held In Beijing
|Nine National Standards For Textile And Footwear, Including "Technical Requirements For Ecological Textiles"
|- Industry standard | The Gospel Of Small And Medium-Sized Technological Enterprises: Anti Monopoly Guidelines In The Field Of Platform Economy (Draft)
- Dialogue column | Shenzhen Fashion Show: Director Liu Yongqing, Director Xuan Dongxiao, Section Chief Dong Wei On The Development Of Qinghe Cashmere
- Dress culture | Kapok Road, Chinese Elegant Affairs, Flower Arrangement, Room Fragrance
- Mall Express | Mushroom Street Double 11 Staged War Report: Turnover In The First 2 Hours Exceeded That Of Last Year
- Market trend | Keqiao Printing And Dyeing Enterprises' First Production Peak Season After "Epidemic"
- Daily headlines | Attention Of Foreign Trade People! Products Exported To EU And UK May Face Double Certification
- Fabric accessories | Analysis Of Foreign Trade Index In October
- Fabric accessories | Textile And Clothing Industry: Recovery After Peak Season, Bright And Stick To Long-Term Value
- Fabric accessories | Shenzhen Textile A (000045): Completed Repurchase And Cancellation Of 1.5662 Million Restricted Shares
- Fashion shoes | Release Details Of Cpfm X Swarovski Co Branded Dunk Low Diamond Shoes
- Shenzhen Fashion Show: Director Liu Yongqing, Director Xuan Dongxiao, Section Chief Dong Wei On The Development Of Qinghe Cashmere
- Kapok Road, Chinese Elegant Affairs, Flower Arrangement, Room Fragrance
- Mushroom Street Double 11 Staged War Report: Turnover In The First 2 Hours Exceeded That Of Last Year
- Keqiao Printing And Dyeing Enterprises' First Production Peak Season After "Epidemic"
- Attention Of Foreign Trade People! Products Exported To EU And UK May Face Double Certification
- Analysis Of Foreign Trade Index In October
- Textile And Clothing Industry: Recovery After Peak Season, Bright And Stick To Long-Term Value
- Shenzhen Textile A (000045): Completed Repurchase And Cancellation Of 1.5662 Million Restricted Shares
- Release Details Of Cpfm X Swarovski Co Branded Dunk Low Diamond Shoes
- Jonah Hill X Adidas New Co Branded Samba Shoe Collection